This paper sets forth a model of contracting for delivery in an environment with time to build and adverse selection. The optimal contract is derived and characterized and it takes the form of a deadline contract. Such a contract stipulates a deadline for delivery for each possible type of agent efficiency. The optimal contract induces inefficient delay by using delivery time as a screening device. Furthermore, rents are increasing in the agent's efficiency. In meeting the deadline, the agent's effort is strictly increasing over time, due to discounting. It is shown that increasing the project's gross value decreases optimal delivery time, while increasing the scale or difficulty of the project increases it. Last, it is shown that the agent's rents are increasing in both project difficulty and gross project value. r
Introduction
A major consideration in scheduling any but the most standard project, is to estimate the duration of the development phase. In virtually all projects where completion takes time, such as weapons development, infrastructure, construction and software development, a procurer must determine the production schedule and in doing so, trade off different considerations such as speedy completion and the amount of committed resources. Since many such projects are executed to order by third parties, the question arises of how to provide correct incentives for the third party in order to align his interests with those of the procurer. Despite the issue's obvious practical importance, there has been surprisingly little attention paid in the economics literature to how such schedules are determined and to how such schedules are influenced by incentive considerations.
1 For many such investment projects, timely completion is of paramount importance, as delays entail considerable foregone benefits (profits, or social benefits when the procurer is a government entity). To be sure, much attention has been given to the issue of forecasting development time. 2 Maybe not surprisingly, a lot of this early literature reports considerable bias in forecasts of development time. This suggests that there is something inherently missing in their approach and incentives seem to be a leading candidate.
In order to study these issues within an asymmetric information framework, this paper analyzes the question of optimal contract design in a model with time to build and adverse selection. An agent exerts effort over time towards project completion subject to a production function which is parameterized by a privately known efficiency parameter. With convex disutility of the rate of effort, the agent has an incentive to prolong the development period, ceteris paribus. The principal on the other hand, discounts the value of the project from the time of completion and thus has an interest in speedy delivery.
The main findings of the analysis are as follows. Under complete information, the optimal accumulation of progress is such that along the efficient effort path, the marginal discounted disutility of effort is constant. That is, effort is exerted in such a manner that the agent cannot benefit from changing the intertemporal distribution of effort. In turn, optimal delivery time is such that the marginal benefit of compressing the schedule marginally is equal to the extra disutility associated with
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1 For an interesting historical account of the dichotomy between the economics and the engineering approaches to project scheduling, see Gulledge and Womer (1986) . 2 In the context of weapons development, Peck and Scherer (1962) and Marshall and Meckling (1962) discussed these issues at length, as did Mansfield et al. (1971) in a study of pharmaceuticals development. Within software engineering, a still active and very influential line of research initiated by Norden (1958) and Putnam (1978) searches for mathematical formulae which fit data on development time and resource phasing (see e.g. Pillai and Nair, 1997 for a recent contribution to this literature and a review of existing work). Most of this work has been either descriptive or positive in nature and has few normative implications. For example, Putnam (1978) states that ''if we know the management parameters [. . .] then we can generate the manpower, instantaneous cost, and cumulative cost of a software project at any time t by using the Rayleigh equation''. In other words, the problem of scheduling is viewed in a very mechanistic way which wholly disregards any influence that contracting and incentives may have on outcomes.
having to increase effort in order to complete marginally earlier. Turning to characterization, it is shown that an increase in the principal's gross value of the completed project decreases optimal delivery time and increases the effort exerted at all stages of the project. Furthermore, an increase in the project's scale or difficulty increases optimal delivery time and decreases exerted effort at all but the last stage of the project.
Turning to the incomplete information case, the optimal contract effectively uses delivery time as a screening device and is characterized by a no distortion at the top result. Namely, it is shown that the optimal contract, in trading off efficiency and informational rents, prescribes an efficient termination time only for the most efficient type of agent. For agents of lower efficiency, the optimal contract distorts delivery time by inducing inefficient delay in completion. Furthermore, rents enjoyed by the agent are decreasing in delivery time, tending to zero for the most inefficient type of agent. The comparative dynamics of the complete information model carry over to the incomplete information setting. Last, comparative analysis of the optimal contract to changes in gross project value and project scale/difficulty is performed. This analysis shows that the rents enjoyed by the agent are increasing in both the project's gross value and in its scale.
To the best of my knowledge, only two contributions have studied the issue of delivery time within a contracting framework explicitly, the first of which is Cukierman and Shiffer (1976) . They study a complete information model in which a principal and an agent contract for delivery of a project. In this context, they show that many of the most commonly used payment schemes give the agent perverse incentives and are thus likely to induce inefficient delays in project completion. In their words, 'in commonly used payment methods there is a built-in incentive for the supplier to submit the product at a suboptimal date'. They propose a number of different ways through which contracts can induce the agent to deliver at the optimal date. While their work identifies an important issue and goes some way towards addressing it by pointing out the flaws of existing procedures, their analysis is crucially dependent on the assumption of complete information. This assumption renders contract design almost irrelevant as the first best may be achieved by making the agent residual claimant, e.g. by simply selling the blueprint to him for a fixed fee equal to the first best profits. In practice, there seems to be many sources of asymmetric information. The agent's skills in completing the project may be private information, or the agent's accounting records may be unavailable to the principal. But whenever this type of asymmetric information is present, it is likely to be exploited for private benefit. In independent and concurrent work dealing with similar issues, Tsur and Zemel (2002) consider the timing of environmental innovations within a principal agent framework. While their model is structurally similar to the one presented here, they focus on a different set of applications and do not deal with comparative analysis of the optimal contract with respect to the parameters of the model.
Methodologically, the present work lies at the intersection of two existing literatures. First, it is in the tradition of a series of papers on optimal R&D projects, following Lucas (1971) and Kamien and Schwartz (1971) . Both these contributions,
as well as that of Grossman and Shapiro (1986a,b) , study optimal resource allocation under uncertainty as dynamic decision theoretic problems. The base model studied here is similar to the deterministic versions of these contributions. This type of model is very well suited for the analysis of completion time as it has a clear cut tradeoff between development time and resources spent (or effort exerted). Importantly, these papers do not deal with the question of incentives. Second, the incomplete information extension of the present model belongs to the literature on procurement under adverse selection, as developed by Tirole (1986, 1998) .
The basic model is set out in Section 2. In Section 3, the complete information benchmark is analyzed and comparative dynamics analysis performed. The incomplete information case is studied in Section 4 and Section 5 offers concluding comments. The Appendix contains proofs omitted in the main text.
The model
A principal owns the blueprint to a project which yields gross value R40 upon completion. This value may be interpreted as an infinite flow of future profits, accruing from the time of project completion. The reward and all expenses are discounted at rate r40. Assume that the project is completed when k40 units of effective effort have been accumulated. The constant k may be interpreted as a number of effective man-hours or as some physical attribute of the project, such as kilometers of a highway. Alternatively, k may be thought of as a measure of the difficulty or scale of the project.
In order to complete the project, the principal hires an agent to exert effort towards project completion. Let xðtÞ 2 R þ denote the agent's instantaneous rate of effort at time t. This effort is translated into progress towards project completion at rate yxðtÞ, where y is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F on ½y; y with y 40. The parameter y characterizes the agent's efficiency. 3 In exerting effort, the agent incurs disutility at rate cðxðtÞÞ40 for xðtÞ40 with c 0 40, c 00 40 and c 000 X0. Like the principal, the agent discounts the future at rate r40. Since it will never be optimal to accumulate more effort than required to complete the project, completion time T and effort xðtÞ satisfy the equation
Throughout, it will be assumed that the modeled problem indeed has an optimal solution and that this solution is interior. An existence result may possibly be obtained by considering the solution of auxiliary problems as outlined in Seierstad
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3 In software engineering, there are several measures used for the size of a project k. Two such measures are total effective lines of code and points of functionality. Accordingly, a widely used measure for efficiency y is a programmer's lines of code per day.
and Sydsaeter (1987, pp. 147-151) . Last, the assumption is maintained that production is worth undertaking for all types of agent efficiency y.
Complete information
Under complete information, the agent's type y is known by the principal. Thus incentive compatibility is irrelevant and the optimal contract holds each type of agent to his reservation utility (which is normalized to zero), i.e. the participation constraint is binding. The principal must determine the optimal allocation of effort over time and the optimal time of project completion. Thus the problem of the principal is max
subject to (1).
In analyzing this problem, it shall prove useful to make a series of transformations of the objective and the constraints. First note that (2) is equivalent to 
Next, note that since the differential equation constraint in (4) holds for all t lðtÞ½yxðtÞ À _ zðtÞ ¼ 0 (5) for all t 2 ½0; T and arbitrary function lðtÞ. Adding this term to the integrand in (3) does not alter the optimal solution and the problem can therefore be rewritten as the following unconstrained problem (subject to appropriate boundary conditions in (4)):
Integrating the last term in (6) by parts yields the equivalent problem max xðtÞ;T
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Treating progress zðtÞ in (7) as a choice variable yields the familiar optimality condition for problems with an integral constraint, namely that _ lðtÞ ¼ 0. That is, in optimum the multiplier is constant over time and terms multiplying _ lðtÞ can be omitted. Using this and using the boundary conditions (4) in (7) yields the final form of the problem:
Next, the problem is solved in two stages. First, the optimal effort trajectory is characterized for arbitrary termination time T. Second, the optimal termination time is characterized, given the optimal effort path.
In this problem, accumulated progress zðtÞ is the state variable and effort xðtÞ is the control variable. For fixed T, it follows that at an interior solution a necessary 4 condition for optimality is an effort trajectory characterized by e rt ylðtÞ ¼ c 0 ðxðtÞÞ
This leads to the following characterization of the optimal solution:
Proposition 1. Under complete information: (i) Effort is exerted from the outset.
(ii) Effort is strictly increasing over time.
Proof. Part (i) follows immediately from observing that if xðtÞ ¼ 0 on some interval ½0; s, the whole project is just delayed for s amount of time and the net benefit of project completion accordingly discounted. Part (ii) follows from (9) and is an artefact of discounting & Since the multiplier lðtÞ is constant, (9) calls for a trajectory of effort xðtÞ such that the discounted disutility of effort is constant over the duration of the project.
Turning to the characterization of the optimal termination time, differentiating (8) with respect to termination time T and exploiting the boundary conditions, the optimal T can be characterized implicitly by the equation
Evaluating (9) at t ¼ T and combining with (10) yields
Eq. (11) has a straightforward interpretation. Consider compressing the schedule such that termination is achieved an instant sooner. The benefit of this compression is the value of receiving the reward an instant sooner, rR, plus the costs saved at time T, namely cðxðTÞÞ. The costs of this compression is the increase in cost associated
4 Note that since the second-order condition with respect to effort xðtÞ reduces to Àe Àrt c 00 ðxðtÞÞo0 (the inequality follows since c is convex), the objective is concave in effort for fixed T and the following condition is both necessary and sufficient for optimality. It should be mentioned that (9) can be derived by Pontryagin's maximum principle and that (10) is just the usual transversality condition. Nevertheless, the Hamiltonian function is not useful for the analysis that follows and will thus not be employed. with slightly increasing effort over the (slightly shorter) duration of the project, c 0 ðxðTÞÞxðTÞ. Before characterizing this solution further, it is shown that (10) is also a locally sufficient condition for T to be optimal. Noting that along an optimal trajectory, dxðtÞ=dT ¼ dzðtÞ=dT ¼ 0 for all t 2 ½0; T and using the boundary conditions in (4), the second derivative of (8) with respect to T reduces to re
ÀrT ðrR þ cðxðTÞÞÞ þ 2yxðTÞl T ðTÞ.
Exploiting (9) along the optimal trajectory, (12) reduces to
where the inequality follows from observing that the bracketed expression is zero at the candidate termination time T because of (11). The comparative dynamics of the optimal solution are gathered in the following proposition, the proof of which is relegated to Appendix A.
Proposition 2. Under complete information: (i) An increase in project value R decreases the optimal termination time T and increases the optimal path xðtÞ at all stages of the project. (ii) An increase in project difficulty k increases the optimal termination time T, decreases initial effort xð0Þ but leaves final effort xðTÞ unchanged.
The results so far may be understood by considering the marginal benefit and cost of slightly stretching the schedule in cost-termination time space, as illustrated in Fig. 1 .
An increase in gross value R shifts the marginal benefit of stretching the schedule downward, while leaving unchanged the marginal cost of doing so (recall that both are negative). In turn, this shifts the intersection of the two curves (yielding the optimal delivery time) leftward. Similarly, an increase in project difficulty k leaves the marginal benefit of stretching the schedule unchanged, while pushing the marginal cost downward. The intersection thus shifts to the right. Last, note that the agent's efficiency y only influences the marginal cost curve. An increase in y causes the marginal cost curve to shift upward, thereby lowering the optimal termination time.
Under complete information, there are a multitude of ways in which the optimal delivery time can be implemented. The simplest is to instruct the agent to deliver at the optimal time and to pay him a wage equal to the total discounted disutility associated with the stipulated delivery time. Alternatively, the principal may offer the agent a wage which depreciates at the same rate as the principal's value of the project. This is in effect a contract with a liquidated damages clause. This and several other equivalent contracts are suggested and discussed by Cukierman and Shiffer (1976) .
Example. The derivations so far only characterize the optimal path and completion time implicitly. For the special case of quadratic disutility, i.e. cðxÞ ¼ x 2 =2, the optimal delivery time and effort trajectory can be derived explicitly. They are
given by
xðtÞ ¼ e rt rk yðe rTðyÞ À 1Þ ,
where the condition y ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi 2rR p À rk40 is imposed. In achieving this delivery time and keeping the agent to his participation constraint, the wage must be set to wðyÞ ¼ rk 2 2y 2 ðe rTðyÞ À 1Þ .
The derivation is a straightforward exercise in variational calculus and is thus omitted.
Benefits, costs 5 See Toxvaerd (2002) for details or Lucas (1971) or Kamien and Schwartz (1981) for treatments of similar problems.
Incomplete information
Now turn to the incomplete information setting. Suppose that the principal offers the same menu of contracts as under complete information, i.e. the agent announces his type y, completes by time TðyÞ and is paid wages wðyÞ. Under this contract, since the agent's type is unobservable to the principal, all but the least efficient type of agent has an incentive to misreport his type and claim to be of type y. This is because the cost of project completion is decreasing in the agent's efficiency and because the first-best contract holds each type to his reservation utility. The outcome would thus be project completion at time TðyÞ irrespective of type and result in large rents accruing to the agent. This means that the principal can do strictly better by offering a contract that properly trades off efficiency in project completion against informational rents. In particular, the optimal incomplete information contract is such that the more efficient the agent is, the larger rents does he earn. Furthermore, the lower the efficiency of the agent is, the more is his stipulated delivery time distorted away from the efficient delivery time.
To solve for the optimal incomplete information contract, first note that the analysis of the complete information benchmark was carried out for arbitrary type y and that the optimal effort trajectory and termination time were functions of the type (although this dependence was suppressed for notational clarity). Now consider the setting in which y is not observed by the principal. In solving for the optimal contract, a choice must be made for the control variable and the state variable. As usual, the agent's rent is treated as a state variable. Since effort is a function (of time), using it as a control variable would unnecessarily complicate the analysis. But note that for arbitrary completion time T, the agent will always find it optimal to choose an effort trajectory from the efficient family given by (9). Thus, given a type y, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the efficient trajectories xðtÞ and termination time T. The fact that T is a sufficient statistic for effort is convenient, as termination time can thus be used as the control variable.
In solving for the optimal contract under asymmetric information, a direct revelation mechanism will be employed. In particular, the principal asks the agent to announce his type and based on the announcement b y offers a contract from a menu fwð b yÞ; Tð b yÞg. The agent is then paid a wage wð b yÞ and must meet the production deadline Tð b yÞ.
It should be noted that in offering such a menu, it is implicitly assumed that the principal will not find it optimal to make wages conditional on observed progress zðtÞ. Since perfect commitment is assumed, this is indeed without loss of optimality. Were the principal to make wages contingent on progress, he would, upon observing progress, be able to perfectly infer the agent's type and thus extract all surplus. As this would be correctly anticipated by the agent, all types would pool and mimic the behavior of the least efficient agent. Clearly, this would be suboptimal from the principal's perspective, who can thus gain by committing to a contract written solely on delivery time TðyÞ.
6 In what follows, it is assumed that the distribution F satisfies d dy
which is the standard monotone likelihood ratio property. 
The agent's problem
Before writing up the principal's problem under incomplete information, the relevant incentive constraints of the problem will be derived.
8 Introduce the agent's rent as a new state variable. Denote by Uðy; b yÞ the rent accruing to an agent of type y who announces to be of type b y. This is given by 
In Appendix B it is shown that incentive compatibility implies that TðyÞ is a monotone (decreasing) function, which in turn implies that the function wð b yÞ is differentiable. The use of the first-order approach is thus justified and the first-order condition for truth-telling is given by U^yðy; b yÞ ¼ 0, while the second-order condition is U^y^yðy; b yÞo0. Totally differentiating the first-order condition yields U^y^yðy; b yÞ ¼ ÀU^y y ðy; b yÞ and thus the local second-order condition becomes U^y y ðy; b yÞ40. From (19) it follows that 9 U^y y ðy; yÞ ¼ Àe ÀrTðyÞ rky À2 c 0 ðxðTðyÞÞÞ _ TðyÞ
and so the local second-order condition reduces to _ TðyÞo0. In the optimal contract it is indeed the case that _ TðyÞo0. This is shown in Appendix D, where it is also
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6 Furthermore, note that perfect commitment is already assumed implicitly by the use of a direct revelation mechanism.
7 See e.g. Laffont and Tirole (1998) for an interpretation. 8 As will become apparent in what follows, the analysis of the optimal incomplete information contract will employ arguments that parallel those by Laffont and Tirole (1986) . But the analysis is greatly complicated by the fact that the agent's type y will appear in limits of integration and in the constraints. In Laffont and Tirole (1986) , the target (i.e. costs) is linear in both type and effort, a fact that greatly simplifies their analysis. Thus, it is not a priori clear that their results can be carried over to the current setting.
9 See Appendix C for details of this derivation.
shown that this monotonicity result and the first-order condition for truth-telling are sufficient conditions for truth-telling to be a global optimum. Denote by UðyÞ the rent accruing to an agent of type y when truth-telling is induced, i.e. UðyÞ ¼ Uðy; b yÞj^y ¼y . By the envelope theorem, it follows from (19) that
Àrt y À1 c 0 ðxðtÞÞxðtÞ dtX0 (21) where (9) has been used to eliminate the multiplier. This differential equation in y shows the rate of change in the agent's rent when truth-telling is induced.
The principal's problem
Next, turn to the principal's maximization problem. It is given by 
subject to the participation constraint UðyÞX0 for all y 2 ½y; y and the incentive compatibility constraint (21). In order to avoid confusion with the multiplier lðtÞ in the complete information analysis, zðtÞ in (22) denotes the multiplier on the differential equation constraint in (4). Since from (21) the agent's rent is increasing in type, the participation constraint can be reduced to the requirement that UðyÞX0. The problem can be further simplified by noting that (21) implies that 
Note that the problem now has an added state variable, namely the agent's rent UðyÞ. Treating it as a choice variable yields _ mðyÞ ¼ f ðyÞ. But since in optimum UðyÞ ¼ 0, this means that mðyÞ ¼ F ðyÞ À 1p0.
Characterization
From (24) 
Comparing (26) with (9), it is immediate that the optimal trajectory under incomplete information is lower than that under complete information. As will be shown shortly, this naturally also influences the optimal delivery time TðyÞ.
To characterize the optimal termination time, differentiate (24) with respect to TðyÞ and evaluate along the optimal trajectory to obtain e rTðyÞ zðTðyÞÞyxðTðyÞÞ ¼ rR þ cðxðTðyÞÞÞ À F ðyÞ À 1 f ðyÞ c 0 ðxðTðyÞÞÞxðTðyÞÞy À1 . (27) Evaluating (26) 
Eq. (28) characterizes the optimal termination time TðyÞ implicitly. It calls for setting TðyÞ such that the marginal benefit of completing an instant sooner is equated with the marginal cost of doing so. But note that the right-hand side of (28) has a positive term added as compared to the right-hand side of (11). This term captures the fact that in trading off efficiency and informational rents, the optimal incomplete information contract calls for a distortion of delivery time. In cost-termination time space, as illustrated in Fig. 1 , asymmetric information leaves the marginal benefit of stretching the schedule unchanged, while shifting downward the marginal costs of doing so. In turn, the intersection of the curves moves rightward. Also, note that the shift caused by asymmetric information is increasing in type y. To see the direction of this distortion, note that for y ¼ y, F ðyÞ ¼ 1 and thus rR þ cðxðTðyÞÞÞ ¼ c 0 ðxðTðyÞÞÞxðTðyÞÞ. Thus there is no distortion of delivery time for the most efficient type of agent. In contrast, for yoy, the marginal cost of an instant's postponement is greater than the marginal benefit of such a postponement and thus the prescribed delivery time is greater than the efficient one. 
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Note that in contrast to Laffont and Tirole (1986) , it is not appropriate to talk about under-provision of effort within this model, as the total amount of effective effort needed for project completion is exogenously given. Rather, the optimal contract induces an inefficient distribution of effort over time.
For y ¼ y there is no rent, i.e. UðyÞ ¼ 0, while for y4 y, rents are positive and increasing.
The results so far are gathered in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Under incomplete information: (i) The optimal contract induces inefficient delay in delivery for all but the most efficient type of agent and the distortion is decreasing in type.
(ii) The least efficient agent earns no rents while more efficient types earn positive rents which are increasing in type.
Example (continued). In the example considered in Section 3, let y 2 fy; yg and q ¼ Prðy ¼ yÞ. Optimal delivery times are given by
where r is the relevant solution to the polynomial
and
Clearly, for the high type y delivery time coincides with the efficient one. For y, it can be shown numerically that TðyÞ is larger than the efficient delivery time for the low type. 
Comparative analysis
Next, turn to the comparative analysis of the optimal contract. In analyzing the complete information benchmark, comparative dynamics analysis was presented for variations in project difficulty k and gross project value R. These carry over to the incomplete information setting.
Proposition 4. Under incomplete information: (i) An increase in project value R decreases the optimal termination time T and increases the optimal path xðtÞ at all stages of the project. (ii) An increase in project difficulty k increases the optimal termination time T, decreases initial effort xð0Þ but leaves final effort xðTÞ unchanged.
Proof. For the proof, define the incomplete information marginal cost function xðxðtÞÞ c 0 ðxðtÞÞ À ðF ðyÞ À 1Þ=f ðyÞ½c 00 ðxðtÞÞxðtÞ þ c 0 ðxðtÞÞy À1 (see the right-hand side of Eq. (26)) and note that x 0 ðxðtÞÞ40 since c 000 X0. Thus xðxðtÞÞ is monotone
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The derivation of the optimal completion times is very lengthy and does not add much new insight. It is thus omitted. For details, see Toxvaerd (2002) . and therefore invertible. Substituting the incomplete information marginal cost function xðxðtÞÞ for the complete information marginal cost function c 0 ðxðtÞÞ, the proof of Proposition 2 contained in Appendix A follows immediately. & Last, note that the rent of the agent as given by (29) is naturally also affected by such changes in the parameters of the project. Specifically, the rent changes in the following way:
Proposition 5. Under incomplete information: (i) An increase in project value R increases the rent earned by all but the least efficient type of agent. (ii) An increase in project difficulty k increases the rent for all but the least efficient type of agent.
Proof. (i) Recall that optimal termination time is decreasing in R. But l T o0 (see Appendix A) and thus l increases as an effect of increasing R. By (19) the agent's rent therefore decreases, ceteris paribus. In order not to violate the participation constraint of type y, the wage specified for the most inefficient type of agent must increase. Denote this increase by DwðyÞ. Suppose that DwðyÞpDwðyÞ for some type y slightly above y. If the wage increase is largest for the least efficient agent, the agent with slightly higher type can benefit from reporting to be type y, thereby violating the incentive compatibility constraint. Thus DwðyÞ is increasing in y. But since l y o0 (see Appendix A), the cost of completing marginally earlier is decreasing in type. Since the change in wages is increasing in type and the cost is decreasing, the result follows.
(ii) From (19), it follows that UðyÞ k ¼ ÀlðTðyÞÞo0. Again, note that in increasing difficulty, the wage specified for the least efficient agent must increase to the extent that it yields zero rent after the change. Suppose that DwðyÞpDwðyÞ for some y slightly above y, i.e. that the increase in wage is bounded above by that prescribed to the least efficient agent. Ex ante, i.e. before the increase in k, incentive compatibility implies that any type prefers reporting the truth to mimicking that of a lower type. Last note that since l y ðTðyÞÞo0 (see Appendix A), the disutility associated with higher k is decreasing in type. If DwðyÞpDwðyÞ as supposed, incentive compatibility is violated after the increase in k as the type slightly higher than y can now secure himself a higher increase in wage by reporting to be type y. Thus it must be that DwðyÞ4DwðyÞ. Since the increase in wage is thus increasing in type but the disutility decreasing in type, rent must, by (19), increase. & For completeness, note that in the optimal contract, it follows from (29) that the wage transfer as a function of the agent's type is given by 
As a last point, it should be mentioned that under the maintained assumptions, it is not optimal to induce different types of agent to pool and choose the same contract from the menu (i.e. to induce bunching). This is because the principal's objective is concave under the monotone likelihood ratio property (17). Concavity implies that the local incentive constraint is both a necessary and sufficient condition for optimality (i.e. that the agent's global second-order condition is satisfied). Truth-telling (and hence separation) is therefore optimal for both the agent and the principal. The assumption c 000 X0 is not needed for concavity of the principal's objective, a fact that stems from the aggregation of costs over time.
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Rather, the assumption is imposed to simplify the analysis of the comparative dynamics under incomplete information (see Proof of Proposition 4).
Concluding remarks
The present paper offers a stylized model in which optimal delivery times and deadlines can be derived and fruitfully analyzed. While it is certainly true that in practice a myriad of other unmodeled factors influence how fast a project is completed or at which rate progress towards completion is achieved, the basic tradeoff between effort and completion time emphasized in the present work seems to be of main importance. Not only is it satisfying on theoretical grounds, but it has also been identified in the empirical literature.
13 While the introductory section motivated the model in terms of a procurement relationship, the analysis is also applicable to relationships involving workers, managers or subdivisions within a firm.
In the present analysis, it is assumed that the principal is uncertain about the agent's type y. An alternative, but qualitatively similar, set of assumptions would be that y is known by the principal but that the agent has private information about the scale of the project k. This variation more closely resembles the setup in Grossman and Shapiro (1986b) .
An interesting issue is that of moral hazard in connection with the provision of incentives for the completion of projects. Such a setting is presented in Toxvaerd (2005) . In that (discrete time) model, an agent moves along the nodes of a directed graph, with transition probabilities determined by the agent's unobserved effort. That model is also better suited to study the effects that commitment has on project completion and to study the dynamics of optimal contracting.
Appendix A
In order to derive the comparative dynamics of the model, some intermediate results are needed.
14 First note that in optimum, the multiplier lðtÞ is determined by (9), (10) and the constraint (1). Thus it solves the equation
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In some static models, assumptions similar to c 000 X0 are needed in order to ensure concavity and thus make bunching suboptimal. See e.g. Laffont and Tirole (1998). 13 See e.g. the discussion in Peck and Scherer (1962) , where this tradeoff is derived from an analysis of manhour-curves, and the literature surveyed in Pillai and Nair (1997) which studies so-called NordenRaleigh analysis of expenditure patterns and project scheduling. 14 These derivations are along the lines of those in Grossman and Shapiro (1986a). Keep in mind that the solution is a function of k and y for arbitrary termination time T. By the implicit function theorem, this value is unique and has continuous derivatives. Specifically,
Next, define the value function V ðxðtÞ; T; R; k; yÞ ¼ max
Differentiating (10) 
Initial effort is given by c 0 ðxð0ÞÞ À l ¼ 0. Thus
Terminal effort is in turn determined implicitly by (11), i.e. rR ¼ c 0 ðxðTÞÞxðTÞ À cðxðTÞÞ. An increase in R must correspond to an increase in the right-hand side. But this is increasing in terminal effort since d dxðTÞ ½c 0 ðxðTÞÞxðTÞ À cðxðTÞÞ ¼ c 00 ðxðTÞÞxðTÞ40.
Thus dxðTÞ dR 40.
In sum, higher gross value R reduces optimal completion time and increases effort at all stages of the project.
Next, consider an increase in the difficulty of the project k. Differentiating (39) with respect to k and then with respect to T and rearranging yields dT dk ¼ ÀV Tk ðxðtÞ; T; R; k; yÞ V TT ðxðtÞ; T; R; k; yÞ ¼ ÀV kT ðxðtÞ; T; R; k; yÞ V TT ðxðtÞ; T; R; k; yÞ
V TT ðxðtÞ; T; R; k; yÞ 40.
Next, since k does not appear in (11),
Thus, higher difficulty increases optimal completion time and leaves terminal effort unchanged. To see how initial effort varies with k, note that the following identity holds:
V ðxðtÞ; T; R; k 1 þ k 2 ; yÞ ¼ V ðxðtÞ; T; V ðxðtÞ; T; R; k 2 ; yÞ; k 1 ; yÞ.
That is, a project with return R of difficulty k 1 þ k 2 is worth as much as a project with return V ðxðtÞ; T; R; k 2 ; yÞ of difficulty k 1 . Differentiating (46) with respect to k 1 yields V k ðxðtÞ; T; R; k 1 þ k 2 ; yÞ ¼ V k ðxðtÞ; T; V ðxðtÞ; T; R; k 2 ; yÞ; k 1 ; yÞ.
Differentiating next with respect to k 2 yields V kk ðxðtÞ; T; R; k 1 þ k 2 ; yÞ ¼ V kR ðxðtÞ; T; V ðxðtÞ; T; R; k 2 ; yÞ; k 1 ; yÞV k ðxðtÞ; T; R; k 2 ; yÞ.
But V k ðxðtÞ; T; R; k 2 ; yÞ ¼ Àlo0 and thus sign½V kk ðxðtÞ; T; R; k 1 þ k 2 ; yÞ ¼ Àsign½V kR ðxðtÞ; T; V ðxðtÞ; T; R; k 2 ; yÞ; k 1 ; yÞ.
Last, since
it follows that V kk ðxðtÞ; T; R; k 1 þ k 2 ; yÞ40.
Thus the value function is a decreasing convex function of difficulty k. That implies that V kk ðxðtÞ; T; R; k 2 ; yÞ ¼ Àl k 40 ) l k o0.
Since initial effort is given implicitly by the equation c 0 ðxð0ÞÞ À l ¼ 0, it follows that
In other words, an increase in the difficulty of the project lowers initial effort in the optimal path. As an aside, note that by the envelope theorem, V R ðxðtÞ; T; R; k; yÞ ¼ e ÀrT
and thus V RR ðxðtÞ; T; R; k; yÞ ¼ Àre ÀrT dT dR 40.
Thus the value function is increasing and convex in the gross value of the project R.
Appendix B
To show monotonicity of TðyÞ in y (i.e. that it is decreasing), pick two types y; y with y oy and notice that incentive compatibility implies that Uðy; yÞXUðy; yÞ, Uðy; yÞXUðy; yÞ.
Subtracting and rearranging yields ½Uðy; yÞ À Uðy; yÞ À ½Uðy; yÞ À Uðy; yÞX0.
Using ( 
X0. ð58Þ
Differentiating (19) with respect to TðyÞ, using (9) and differentiating again with respect to y yields (62) which, after exploiting (9) and evaluating along the optimal trajectory, reduces to _ TðyÞ½cðxðTðyÞÞÞ À c 0 ðxðTðyÞÞÞxðTðyÞÞe ÀrTðyÞ .
A similar argument holds for b y ! y with b yoy. Since these limits coincide, wðyÞ is differentiable at a point where the two last terms of the integrand in (19) are differentiable.
Appendix C
Differentiating (19) with respect to announced type b y and evaluating along the optimal trajectory xðtÞ yields 
Next, exploit (9) to eliminate terms in (64) involving the multiplier. Differentiating the resulting expression with respect to type y and evaluating at b y ¼ y yields (20).
Appendix D
To show that _ TðyÞo0, start by differentiating (24) with respect to TðyÞ. In the resulting expression, exploit (26) to eliminate terms involving the multiplier zðtÞ. Once this substitution is completed, differentiate with respect to type y and simplify by evaluating along the optimal trajectory xðtÞ. Rearranging yields 
While the numerator N is unambiguously negative, the denominator D is positive under assumption (17).
Appendix E
Given that
U^yðy; yÞ ¼ 0,
hold, truth-telling, i.e. b y ¼ y is a global optimum. To see this, assume that type y strictly prefers to report type b yay so Uðy; b yÞ4Uðy; yÞ.
This implies that Uðy; b yÞ À Uðy; yÞ40 and thus Z^y y U^yðy; aÞ da40.
Using the first-order condition for truth-telling, this inequality is equivalent to Z^y y ½U^yðy; aÞ À U^yða; aÞ da40 (72) or Z^y 
Suppose b y4y. Since _ TðyÞo0, then necessarily yXa for all a 2 ½y; b y. Specifically, pick a ¼ b y which implies that b y4yXa ¼ b y, a contradiction. Similarly, suppose b yoy which implies that ypa for all a 2 ½ b y; y. Pick a ¼ b y, which implies that b yoypa ¼ b y, ARTICLE IN PRESS a contradiction. Thus there is no announcement b yay which yields a strictly higher utility for the agent.
